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Produktbild: Algorithmic Game Theory
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Algorithmic Game Theory 18th International Symposium, SAGT 2025, Bath, UK, September 2–5, 2025, Proceedings

Aus der Reihe Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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79,99 € UVP 90,19 €

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Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

01.09.2025

Abbildungen

XXIX, 504 p. 59 illus., 27 illus. in color.

Herausgeber

Ron Lavi + weitere

Verlag

Springer

Seitenzahl

504

Maße (L/B/H)

23,5/15,5/2,9 cm

Gewicht

803 g

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-3-032-03638-4

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

01.09.2025

Abbildungen

XXIX, 504 p. 59 illus., 27 illus. in color.

Herausgeber

Verlag

Springer

Seitenzahl

504

Maße (L/B/H)

23,5/15,5/2,9 cm

Gewicht

803 g

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-3-032-03638-4

Herstelleradresse

Springer-Verlag KG
Sachsenplatz 4-6
1201 Wien
AT

Email: ProductSafety@springernature.com

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  • Produktbild: Algorithmic Game Theory

  • .- Computational and Algorithmic Aspects of Games.



    .- On the Limitations and Possibilities of Nash Regret Minimization inZero-Sum Matrix Games under Noisy Feedback.



    .- On the Effect of Time Preferences on the Price of Anarchy.



    .- Mixed Nash Equilibria in Discrete Tullock Contests.



    .- Social Welfare in Battery Charging Games.



    .- Improved Hardness Results for the Clearing Problem in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps.



    .- Coordination Mechanisms on Unrelated Machines with Arbitrary Priority Lists.



    .- Facility Location.



    .- Constant-Approximate and Constant-Strategyproof Two-Facility Location.



    .- Constrained Truthful Obnoxious Two-Facility Location with Optional Preferences.



    .- Hotelling-Downs with Facility Synergy: The Mall Effect.



    .- Fair Division and Resource Allocation.



    .- Tractable Graph Structures in EFX Orientation.



    .- Fairness under Equal-Sized Bundles: Impossibility results and Approximation Guarantees.



    .- Online Fair Division for Personalized 2-Value Instances.



    .- A new lower bound for multi-color discrepancy with applications to fair division.



    .- When is Truthfully Allocating Chores no Harder than Goods?.



    .- Markets and Matching.



    .- Unsolvability and Beyond in Many-To-Many Non-Bipartite Stable Matching.



    .- Course Allocation with Credits via Stable Matching.



    .- Bayesian Decision Making.



    .- Bayesian Optimal Stopping with Maximum Value Knowledge.



    .- Persuading Agents in Opinion Formation Games.



    .- A Truthful and Accurate Forecasting Competition Mechanism on Bayesian Network Structured Events.



    .- Mechanism Design and Algorithmic Contracts.



    .- Deterministic Refund Mechanisms.



    .- Near-Linear MIR Algorithms for Stochastically-Ordered Priors.



    .- Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions.



    .- Linear Contracts for Supermodular Functions Based on Graphs.



    .- Computational Social Choice.



    .- Distortion of Multi-Winner Elections on the Line Metric: The Polar Comparison Rule.



    .- Metric Distortion under Group-Fair Objectives.



    .- Robustness of voting mechanisms to external information.