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Algorithmic Game Theory 17th International Symposium, SAGT 2024, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, September 3–6, 2024, Proceedings

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Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

04.09.2024

Abbildungen

XXI, 546 p. 55 illus., 34 illus. in color.

Herausgeber

Guido Schäfer + weitere

Verlag

Springer

Seitenzahl

546

Maße (L/B/H)

23,5/15,5/3,1 cm

Gewicht

850 g

Auflage

2024

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-3-031-71032-2

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

04.09.2024

Abbildungen

XXI, 546 p. 55 illus., 34 illus. in color.

Herausgeber

Verlag

Springer

Seitenzahl

546

Maße (L/B/H)

23,5/15,5/3,1 cm

Gewicht

850 g

Auflage

2024

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-3-031-71032-2

Herstelleradresse

Springer-Verlag KG
Sachsenplatz 4-6
1201 Wien
AT

Email: ProductSafety@springernature.com

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  • Produktbild: Algorithmic Game Theory
  • Produktbild: Algorithmic Game Theory

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