• Produktbild: Three Liability Regimes for Artificial Intelligence
  • Produktbild: Three Liability Regimes for Artificial Intelligence

Three Liability Regimes for Artificial Intelligence Algorithmic Actants, Hybrids, Crowds

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Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

27.07.2023

Verlag

Hart Publishing

Seitenzahl

204

Maße (L/B/H)

23,4/15,6/1,1 cm

Gewicht

294 g

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-1-5099-4937-3

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

27.07.2023

Verlag

Hart Publishing

Seitenzahl

204

Maße (L/B/H)

23,4/15,6/1,1 cm

Gewicht

294 g

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-1-5099-4937-3

Herstelleradresse

Libri GmbH
Europaallee 1
36244 Bad Hersfeld
DE

Email: gpsr@libri.de

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Die Leseprobe wird geladen.
  • Produktbild: Three Liability Regimes for Artificial Intelligence
  • Produktbild: Three Liability Regimes for Artificial Intelligence
  • 1. Digitalisation: The Responsibility Gap
    I. The Problem: The Dangerous Homo Ex Machina
    A. Growing Liability Gaps
    B. Scenarios
    C. Current Law's Denial of Reality
    II. The Overshooting Reaction: Full Legal Subjectivity for E-Persons?
    III. Our Solution: Differential Legal Status Ascriptions for Algorithms
    A. Algorithms in Social and Economic Contexts
    B. (Legal) Form Follows (Social) Function
    IV. Our Approach: Three Digital Risks
    A. 'Socio-Digital Institutions' as Intermediaries between Technology and Law
    B. A Typology of Machine Behaviour
    C. A Typology of Socio-Digital Institutions
    D. A Typology of Liability Risks

    2. Autonomy and Personification
    I. Artificial Intelligence as Actants
    A. Anthropomorphism?
    B. Actants and Action Attribution
    C. Communication with Actants
    II. Gradualised Digital Autonomy
    A. Social Attribution of Autonomy
    B. Legal Criteria of Autonomy
    C. Our Solution: Decision under Uncertainty
    III. Autonomy and Legal Personhood
    A. Against Personification?
    B. Uniform Personification?
    C. Socio-Digital Institutions and Legal Status

    3. Actants: Autonomy Risk
    I. Socio-Digital Institution: Digital Assistance
    II. The Autonomy Risk
    III. Algorithmic Contract Formation
    A. Invalidity of Algorithmic Contracts?
    B. Algorithms as Mere Tools?
    C. Our Solution: Agency Law for Electronic Agents
    D. Limited Legal Personhood - Constellation One
    E. The Digital Agent's Legal Declaration
    F. Digital Assistance and the Principal-Agent Relation
    G. Overstepping of Authority?
    IV. Contractual Liability
    A. The Dilemma of the Tool-Solution
    B. Our Solution: Vicarious Performance
    C. Limited Legal Personhood - Constellation Two
    V. Non-Contractual Liability
    A. Fault-Based Liability?
    B. Product Liability?
    C. Strict Causal Liability for Dangerous Objects and Activities?
    D. Our Solution: Vicarious Liability in Tort
    E. Limited Legal Personhood - Constellation Three
    F. The 'Reasonable Algorithm'
    G. Who is Liable?

    4. Hybrids: Association Risk
    I. Socio-Digital Institution: Human-Machine Associations
    A. Emergent Properties
    B. Hybridity
    C. The Organisational Analogy
    II. The Association Risk
    III. Solution de lege ferenda: Hybrids as Legal Entities?
    IV. Our Solution de lege lata: Enterprise Liability for Human-Machine Networks
    A. Human-Machine Interactions as Networks
    B. Networks and Enterprise Liability 1
    C. Action Attribution and Liability Attribution in Hybrids
    D. Liable Actors
    E. Pro-Rata Network Share Liability
    F. External Liability Concentration: 'One-Stop-Shop' Approach
    G. Internal Liability Distribution: Pro Rata Network Share
    V. Conclusion

    5. Multi-Agent Crowds: Interconnectivity Risk
    I. Socio-Digital Institution: Exposure to Interconnectivity
    A. Non-Communicative Contacts
    B. Distributed Cognitive Processes
    II. The Interconnectivity Risk
    III. Mismatch of New Risks and Existing Solutions
    A. Applying Existing Categories
    B. Vicarious or Product Liability of the Whole Interconnected AI-System?
    C. Collective Liability of Actors Connected to the 'Technical Unit'?
    IV. Our Solution: Socialising the Interconnectivity Risk
    A. Entire or Partial Socialisation?
    B. Risk Pools Decreed by Law
    C. Public Administration of the Risk Pool: The Fund Solution
    D. Financing: Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Components
    E. Participation and Administration
    F. Compensation and Recovery Action
    G. Global Interconnectivity and National Administration

    6. Conclusion: Three Liability Regimes and Their Interrelations
    I. Synopsis and Rules
    A. Digital Assistance: Vicarious Liability
    B. Human-Machine Associations: Enterprise Liability
    C. Interconnectivity: Fund Liability
    II. Socio-Digital Institutions and Liability Law
    A. One-Size-Fits-All or Sector-Specific Piecemeal Approach?
    B. Socio-Digital Institutions
    C. Institution-Generating Liability Law
    D. Differential Treatment of Liable Actors
    E. Calibrating Legal Personhood for AI
    III. Interactions between Three Liability Regimes
    A. Criteria for Delineating the Applicable Liability Regime
    B. No Priority for a Liability Regime
    IV. Exemplary Cases
    A. Vicarious Liability: Robo-Advice
    B. Enterprise Liability: Hybrid Journalism
    C. Collective Funds: Flash Crash
    D. Finale: Google Autocomplete