Produktbild: James M. Buchanan
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James M. Buchanan A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy

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Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Gebundene Ausgabe

Erscheinungsdatum

25.06.2019

Abbildungen

XXI, 34 illus., 7 illus. in color., schwarz-weiss Illustrationen, farbige Illustrationen

Herausgeber

Richard E. Wagner

Verlag

Springer

Seitenzahl

1182

Maße (L/B/H)

21,8/15,4/6,3 cm

Gewicht

1741 g

Auflage

2018

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-3-030-03079-7

Beschreibung

Rezension

“This volume is so broad in scope, so rich in fascinating reflections, so instructive that anybody should benefit from it who has a genuine, if critical, interest in the work of James M. Buchanan. On this basis, it should be a pleasure to enter an informed, open discussion.” (Karen Horn, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 31, 2020)

Portrait

Richard E. Wagner is Holbert L. Harris Professor of Economics at George Mason University, USA. He is Senior Fellow of the Academic Advisory Board at the Independent Institute, the James Madison Institute for Public Policy Studies and the Virginia Institute for Public Policy. He was co-editor of the scholarly journal Constitutional Political Economy from 1989-1997, and he is currently a member of the editorial boards of Constitutional Political Economy, the Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, and the Review of Austrian Economics. He was one of Buchanan’s dissertation students, a co-author with Buchanan, and a faculty colleague for some 25 years.



Produktdetails

Einband

Gebundene Ausgabe

Erscheinungsdatum

25.06.2019

Abbildungen

XXI, 34 illus., 7 illus. in color., schwarz-weiss Illustrationen, farbige Illustrationen

Herausgeber

Richard E. Wagner

Verlag

Springer

Seitenzahl

1182

Maße (L/B/H)

21,8/15,4/6,3 cm

Gewicht

1741 g

Auflage

2018

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-3-030-03079-7

Herstelleradresse

Springer Nature Customer Service Center GmbH
Europaplatz 3
69115 Heidelberg
DE
ProductSafety@springernature.com

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  • Produktbild: James M. Buchanan
  • 1. Who Was James M. Buchanan and Why is He Significant?- Richard E. Wagner

    Part I:  Subjectivism and the Methodology of Political Economy 2. East Anglia, What Should Economists Do Now?- Robert Sugden

    3. Duke, Starting from Where We Are: The Importance of the Status Quo in James Buchanan- Michael Munger

    4. Brown, James Buchanan and the Properly Trained Economist- Peter J. Boettke, George Mason and Rosolino Candela

    5. James Buchanan and the “New Economics of Order” Research Program- Stefan Kolev

    6. George Mason, Emergence, Equilibrium, and Agent-based Modeling: Updating James Buchanan’s Democratic Political Economy- Abigail N. Devereaux, George Mason and Richard E. Wagner

    Part II: Public Finance and the Theory of the State

    7. The Conflict between Constitutionally Constraining the State and Empowering the State to Provide Public Goods- Lawrence H. White

    8. Fiscal Constitutions, Institutional Congruence, and the Organization of Governments- Charles Beat Blankart and David Ehmke

    9. The Irrelevance of Balanced Budget Amendments- David Hebert

    10. Subsidizing Health Insurance: Tax Illusion and Public Choice for a mostly Private Good- Mark V. Pauly 

    11. Inconsistencies in the Finance of Public Services: Government Responses to Excess Demand- Andrew Abbott and Philip Jones

    12. The Unproductive Protective State: The U.S. Defense Sector as a Fiscal Commons- Christopher J. Coyne and Thomas K. Duncan

    13. Contraception without Romance: The Entangled Political Economy of State and Federal Contraception Mandates- Marta Podemska-Mikluch and Gustavus Adolphus

    14. Samaritan’s Dilemmas, Wealth Redistribution, and Polycentricity- Meg Tuszynski and Richard E. Wagner

    Part III: Collective Action and Constitutional Political Economy

    15. Constitutional Reform: Promise and Reality- Dennis Mueller

    16. Constitutional, Political, and Behavioral Feasibility- Alan Hamlin

    17.  Blockchain and Buchanan: Code as Constitution- Shruti Rajagopalan

    18. Blockchains as Constitutional Orders- Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson and Jason Potts

    19. The Questionable Morality of Compromising the Influence of Public Choice by Embracing a “Nobel” Lie- J.R. Clark and Dwight R. Lee.

    20. Beneficent Bullshit- Peter T. Leeson

    21. Groups, Sorting, and Inequality in Constitutional Political Economy- Jayme Lemke

    22. Votes, Vetoes, Voice, and Exit: Constitutional Protections in the work of James M. Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom- Roberta Herzberg

    23.  On the Definition and Nature of Fiscal Coercion- George Tridimas

    24.  Politics as Exchange in the Byzantine Empire- Adam Martin and James Ruhland

    Part IV: Ethics, Social Philosophy, and Liberal Political Economy

    25. James M. Buchanan: Political; Economist, Consistent Individualist- Viktor Vanberg 

    26. A Public Choice Analysis of James M. Buchanan’s Constitutional Project- Randall Holcombe

    27. Buchanan’s Social Contract Unveiled- Enrico Colombatto

    28. Constitutional Design and Politics-as-Exchange: The Optimism of Public Choice- Georg Vanberg

    29. Doing Liberal Political Economy: James M. Buchanan as Exemplar- Glenn L. Furton and Alexander W. Salter

    30. Buchanan, Hayek, and the Limits of Constitutional Ambitions- Donald Boudreaux

    31. James Buchanan and the Return to an Economics of Natural Equals- David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart

    32. From Highways to Clubs: On Buchanan and the Pricing of Public Goods- Alain Marciano

    Part V: Economic Theory as Social Theory

    33. In Defence of (Some) Vainglory: The Advantages of Polymorphic Hobbesianism- Jerry Gaus

    34. Toward a Rule-based Model of Human Choice: On the Nature of Homo Constitutionalus- Roger Congleton

    35. The Constitution of Markets- Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt

    36. The Extent of the Market and Ethics- Yong Yoon

    37. Why Roving Bandits Settle Down: Club Theory and the Emergence of Government- Andrew T. Young 

    38. Rules vs. Discretion in Criminal Sentencing- Daniel D’Amico

    39. Diagnosing the Electorate: James Buchanan in the Role of Political Economist- Solomon Stein

    40. From Models to Experiments: James Buchanan and Charles Plott- Gil Hersch and Daniel Houser

    Part VI: Money, Debt, and the Rule of Law

    41. Rules Versus Authorities:  Buchanan and Simons and Fiscal Policy- Marianne Johnson

    42. The Quest for Fiscal Rules- Lars Feld

    43. The Irresistible Attraction of Public Debt- Vito Tanzi

    44. Can there be such a thing as Legitimate Public Debt in a Democracy? De Viti de Marco and Buchanan Compared- Giuseppe Eusepi

    45. Consequences of the Anachronism of Fractional Reserve Arrangements- Leonidas Zelmanovitz

    Part VII: Buchanan in Relation to Other Prominent Scholars

    46. Italian Influences on Buchanan’s Research Program- Alain Marciano and Manuela Mosca

    47. Paretian Fiscal Sociology- Michael McLure

    48. Artefactual and Artisanship: James M. Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom at the Core and beyond the Boundaries of Public Choice- Paul Dragos Aligica

    49. The Calculus of Consent and the Compound Republic- Robert Bish

    50. Why James Buchanan Kept Frank Knight’s Picture on the Wall despite Fundamental Disagreements on Economics, Ethics, and Politics- Ross Emmett