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The Varieties of Self-Knowledge

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Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Gebundene Ausgabe

Erscheinungsdatum

21.07.2016

Abbildungen

XVI, 288 p.

Verlag

Palgrave Macmillan UK

Seitenzahl

288

Maße (L/B/H)

21,6/15,3/2,1 cm

Gewicht

508 g

Auflage

1st edition 2016

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-1-137-32612-6

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Gebundene Ausgabe

Erscheinungsdatum

21.07.2016

Abbildungen

XVI, 288 p.

Verlag

Palgrave Macmillan UK

Seitenzahl

288

Maße (L/B/H)

21,6/15,3/2,1 cm

Gewicht

508 g

Auflage

1st edition 2016

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-1-137-32612-6

Herstelleradresse

Springer-Verlag GmbH
Tiergartenstr. 17
69121 Heidelberg
DE

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  • Produktbild: The Varieties of Self-Knowledge
  • Produktbild: The Varieties of Self-Knowledge
  • Acknowledgments.- Credits.- List of abbreviations.-
    Introduction.- Chapter one: Varieties of Mental States.- 1. Sensations and
    perceptions.- The objectivity of perceptual representation.- Perceptual
    contents.- Sensory states and sensations.- 2. Two
    kinds of propositional attitudes: dispositions and commitments.- Propositional
    attitudes as dispositions.-  Propositional
    attitudes as commitments.- 3. Emotions.- Emotions as sensations.- Emotions as
    evaluative judgments.- Emotions as felt bodily attitudes.- Emotions as
    perceptions of evaluative properties.- The borderline view of emotions.- 4. Summary.- Chapter two: Varieties of Self-Knowledge.-
    1. First personal self-knowledge.- Groundlessness.- Transparency.- Authority.- 2.
    Counterexamples from content externalism and cognitive science? .- 3. Third-personal
    self-knowledge.- 4. Summary.- Chapter three: Epistemically Robust Accounts.- 1.
    Inner sense theories: Armstrong and Lycan.- 2. Inferential theories: Gopnik and
    Cassam.- 3. Simulation-theories: Goldman and Gordon.- 4. Summary.- Chapter four: Epistemically Weak Accounts.-
    1. Peacocke’s rational internalism.- 2. Burge’s rational externalism.- 3. Evans’ transparency method.- 3.1
    Fernández’ epistemic account.- 3.2 Moran’s deliberative account.- 4. Summary.-
    Chapter five: Expressivism about Self-Knowledge.- 1. At the origins of expressivism:
    Wittgenstein.- 2. Bar-On’s neo-expressivism.- 3. Summary.- Chapter six: Constitutive Theories.- 1. The
    left-to-right side of the Constitutive Thesis: Shoemaker.- 2. The right-to-left
    side of the Constitutive Thesis: Wright.- 3. The two sides of the Constitutive
    Thesis: Bilgrami.- 4. A metaphysically robust kind of constitutivism: Coliva.- The
    first half of the constitutive thesis: transparency.- Objections from empirical
    psychology.- The second half of the constitutive thesis: authority.- 5. Summary.-
    Chapter seven: Pluralism about Self-Knowledge.- 1. Propositional attitudes as
    commitments: the limits of constitutive accounts.- 2. Sensations, basic
    emotions and perceptions and perceptual experiences: constitutivism meets
    expressivism.- Sensations.- Basic emotions.- Perceptions and perceptual
    experiences.- 3. Propositional attitudes as dispositions and complex emotions:
    third-personal self-knowledge.- 4. Summary.- Appendix: Moore’s Paradox.- 1. Moorean
    and Wittgensteinian analyses.- 2. The constraints on any feasible account of
    Moore’s paradox.- 3. What Moore’s paradox isn’t about: Jane’s off case.- 4. What
    Moore’s paradox is about—first pass.- 5. What Moore’s paradox is about—second
    pass.- 6. An objection.- Notes.- Bibliography.- Name index.- Subject index.