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  • Produktbild: The Varieties of Self-Knowledge
  • Produktbild: The Varieties of Self-Knowledge
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The Varieties of Self-Knowledge

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Beschreibung

This book explores the idea that self-knowledge comes in many varieties. We “know ourselves” through many different methods, depending on whether we attend to our propositional attitudes, our perceptions, sensations or emotions. Furthermore, sometimes what we call “self-knowledge” is not the result of any...

Beschreibung

This book explores the idea that self-knowledge
comes in many varieties. We “know ourselves” through many different methods,
depending on whether we attend to our propositional attitudes, our perceptions,
sensations or emotions. Furthermore, sometimes what we call “self-knowledge” is
not the result of any substantial cognitive achievement and the characteristic
authority we grant to our psychological self-ascription is a conceptual
necessity, redeemed by unravelling the structure of several interlocking concepts.
This book critically assesses the main contemporary positions held on the
epistemology of self-knowledge. These include robust epistemic accounts such as
inner sense views and theory-theories; weak epistemic accounts such as
transparency theories and rational internalism and externalism; as well as
expressivist and constitutivist approaches. The author offers an innovative
“pluralist” position on self-knowledge, emphasizing the complexity of the
phenomenon and its resistance to any “monistic” treatment, to pose new and
intriguing philosophical challenges.

Produktdetails

Einband

Gebundene Ausgabe

Erscheinungsdatum

21.07.2016

Abbildungen

XVI, 288 p.

Verlag Palgrave Macmillan UK

Produktdetails

Einband

Gebundene Ausgabe

Erscheinungsdatum

21.07.2016

Abbildungen

XVI, 288 p.

Verlag Palgrave Macmillan UK
Seitenzahl

288

Maße (L/B/H)

21,6/15,3/2,1 cm

Gewicht

469 g

Auflage

1st edition 2016

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-1-137-32612-6

Herstelleradresse

Springer-Verlag GmbH
Europaplatz 3
69115 Heidelberg
DE

Email: ProductSafety@springernature.com

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  • Produktbild: The Varieties of Self-Knowledge
  • Produktbild: The Varieties of Self-Knowledge
  • Acknowledgments.- Credits.- List of abbreviations.-
    Introduction.- Chapter one: Varieties of Mental States.- 1. Sensations and
    perceptions.- The objectivity of perceptual representation.- Perceptual
    contents.- Sensory states and sensations.- 2. Two
    kinds of propositional attitudes: dispositions and commitments.- Propositional
    attitudes as dispositions.-  Propositional
    attitudes as commitments.- 3. Emotions.- Emotions as sensations.- Emotions as
    evaluative judgments.- Emotions as felt bodily attitudes.- Emotions as
    perceptions of evaluative properties.- The borderline view of emotions.- 4. Summary.- Chapter two: Varieties of Self-Knowledge.-
    1. First personal self-knowledge.- Groundlessness.- Transparency.- Authority.- 2.
    Counterexamples from content externalism and cognitive science? .- 3. Third-personal
    self-knowledge.- 4. Summary.- Chapter three: Epistemically Robust Accounts.- 1.
    Inner sense theories: Armstrong and Lycan.- 2. Inferential theories: Gopnik and
    Cassam.- 3. Simulation-theories: Goldman and Gordon.- 4. Summary.- Chapter four: Epistemically Weak Accounts.-
    1. Peacocke’s rational internalism.- 2. Burge’s rational externalism.- 3. Evans’ transparency method.- 3.1
    Fernández’ epistemic account.- 3.2 Moran’s deliberative account.- 4. Summary.-
    Chapter five: Expressivism about Self-Knowledge.- 1. At the origins of expressivism:
    Wittgenstein.- 2. Bar-On’s neo-expressivism.- 3. Summary.- Chapter six: Constitutive Theories.- 1. The
    left-to-right side of the Constitutive Thesis: Shoemaker.- 2. The right-to-left
    side of the Constitutive Thesis: Wright.- 3. The two sides of the Constitutive
    Thesis: Bilgrami.- 4. A metaphysically robust kind of constitutivism: Coliva.- The
    first half of the constitutive thesis: transparency.- Objections from empirical
    psychology.- The second half of the constitutive thesis: authority.- 5. Summary.-
    Chapter seven: Pluralism about Self-Knowledge.- 1. Propositional attitudes as
    commitments: the limits of constitutive accounts.- 2. Sensations, basic
    emotions and perceptions and perceptual experiences: constitutivism meets
    expressivism.- Sensations.- Basic emotions.- Perceptions and perceptual
    experiences.- 3. Propositional attitudes as dispositions and complex emotions:
    third-personal self-knowledge.- 4. Summary.- Appendix: Moore’s Paradox.- 1. Moorean
    and Wittgensteinian analyses.- 2. The constraints on any feasible account of
    Moore’s paradox.- 3. What Moore’s paradox isn’t about: Jane’s off case.- 4. What
    Moore’s paradox is about—first pass.- 5. What Moore’s paradox is about—second
    pass.- 6. An objection.- Notes.- Bibliography.- Name index.- Subject index.