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Produktbild: Internet and Network Economics
Band 5929 - 11%

Internet and Network Economics 5th International Workshop, WINE 2009, Rome, Italy, December 14-18, 2009, Proceedings

Aus der Reihe Lecture Notes in Computer Science
11% sparen

96,99 € UVP 109,99 €

inkl. gesetzl. MwSt., Versandkostenfrei

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

07.12.2009

Abbildungen

XIII, 642 p.

Herausgeber

Stefano Leonardi

Verlag

Springer Berlin

Seitenzahl

642

Maße (B/H)

15,5/23,5 cm

Gewicht

984 g

Auflage

1 Auflage 2009

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-3-642-10840-2

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

07.12.2009

Abbildungen

XIII, 642 p.

Herausgeber

Stefano Leonardi

Verlag

Springer Berlin

Seitenzahl

642

Maße (B/H)

15,5/23,5 cm

Gewicht

984 g

Auflage

1 Auflage 2009

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-3-642-10840-2

Herstelleradresse

Springer-Verlag GmbH
Heidelberger Platz 3
14197 Berlin
Deutschland
Email: sdc-bookservice@springer.com
Url: www.springer.com
Telephone: +49 30 827870
Fax: +49 30 8214091

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  • Produktbild: Internet and Network Economics
  • Invited Talks.- Ad Exchanges: Research Issues.- Adaptive Learning in Systems of Interacting Agents.- Quantifying Outcomes in Games.- Regular Papers.- Competitive Routing over Time.- On 2-Player Randomized Mechanisms for Scheduling.- On Stackelberg Pricing with Computationally Bounded Consumers.- On Best Response Dynamics in Weighted Congestion Games with Polynomial Delays.- Parametric Packing of Selfish Items and the Subset Sum Algorithm.- An Online Multi-unit Auction with Improved Competitive Ratio.- Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions.- Pricing Strategies for Viral Marketing on Social Networks.- Consistent Continuous Trust-Based Recommendation Systems.- The Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree Game on Planar and Bounded-Treewidth Graphs.- Tighter Bounds for Facility Games.- Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness in Finite Bounded Cake-Cutting Protocols.- Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria via Lovász Local Lemma.- Externalities in Keyword Auctions: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment.- Covering Games: Approximation through Non-cooperation.- Contract Auctions for Sponsored Search.- Bidding for Representative Allocations for Display Advertising.- Social Networks and Stable Matchings in the Job Market.- Maximizing the Minimum Load: The Cost of Selfishness.- Competitive Repeated Allocation without Payments.- Pseudonyms in Cost-Sharing Games.- Computing Optimal Contracts in Series-Parallel Heterogeneous Combinatorial Agencies.- Nash Equilibria for Voronoi Games on Transitive Graphs.- Selfish Scheduling with Setup Times.- Computational Aspects of Multimarket Price Wars.- The Impact of Social Ignorance on Weighted Congestion Games.- The Complexity of Models of International Trade.- The Geometry of Truthfulness.- Optimal Incentives for Participationwith Type-Dependent Externalities.- Nash Dynamics in Congestion Games with Similar Resources.- Online Ad Assignment with Free Disposal.- Truthful and Quality Conscious Query Incentive Networks.- An Analysis of Troubled Assets Reverse Auction.- Direction Preserving Zero Point Computing and Applications.- Short Papers.- Continuity Properties of Equilibria in Some Fisher and Arrow-Debreu Market Models.- Route Distribution Incentives.- Wiretapping a Hidden Network.- Refining the Cost of Cheap Labor in Set System Auctions.- On the Power of Mediators.- Strong Nash Equilibria in Games with the Lexicographical Improvement Property.- A Note on Strictly Competitive Games.- The Efficiency of Fair Division.- Sequential Bidding in the Bailey-Cavallo Mechanism.- Subsidized Prediction Markets for Risk Averse Traders.- Envy, Multi Envy, and Revenue Maximization.- Nudging Mechanisms for Technology Adoption.- Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders.- Priority Right Auction for Komi Setting.- Randomized Online Algorithms for the Buyback Problem.- Envy-Free Allocations for Budgeted Bidders.- On the Inefficiency Ratio of Stable Equilibria in Congestion Games.- Betting on the Real Line.- Characterization of Strategy-Proof, Revenue Monotone Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms and Connection with False-Name-Proofness.- 2D-TUCKER Is PPAD-Complete.- Bidder Optimal Assignments for General Utilities.- A New Ranking Scheme of the GSP Mechanism with Markovian Users.- Mediated Equilibria in Load-Balancing Games.- On the Impact of Strategy and Utility Structures on Congestion-Averse Games.- On Strong Equilibria in the Max Cut Game.- Stability and Convergence in Selfish Scheduling with Altruistic Agents.- Gaming Dynamic Parimutuel Markets.- News Posting by Strategic Users in a Social Network.- Erratum.- Erratum to: Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions.